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Article

Defacing Democracy?: The Changing
Nature and Rising Importance of AsApplied Challenges in the Supreme
Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions
Nathaniel Persily†
Jennifer S. Rosenberg‡
In its first three years, the Roberts Court has issued a series of important election law decisions on topics ranging from
gerrymandering and voter identification to regulation of political parties and campaign finance.1 The substance of those decisions has been dramatic enough, but the decisions also illustrate the evolution of important constitutional and election
law doctrines concerning facial and as-applied challenges. The
Court has clarified its strong preference for as-applied challenges in the election law context2 just as it has in others, such
† Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law and Political Science, Columbia Law School.
‡ Voting Rights and Elections Fellow, Brennan Center for Justice at the
New York University School of Law. The views expressed herein are those only of the authors and not reflective of the organizations with which they are
affiliated. Thanks to Richard Briffault, Christopher Elmendorf, Jamal Greene,
Richard Hasen, Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison, and participants in workshops at Rutgers-Camden and the University of Minnesota Law Schools for
helpful comments. Copyright © 2009 by Nathaniel Persily and Jennifer S. Rosenberg.
1. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970,
1976–77 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.
Ct. 1184, 1187 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct.
791, 795 (2008); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652,
2659 (2007); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2598 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2497, 2485 (2006). See generally Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the Roberts Court’s election law cases decided between 2007 and 2008).
2. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22–23).
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as abortion cases.3 The effect of these decisions appears to have
been to make some types of voting rights claims more difficult
to bring, but perhaps the more important development is the
evolution in what the Court means by an as-applied or facial
challenge.
For the most part, those who favor a more aggressive judicial role in protecting constitutional rights also worry about
judicial timidity in favoring as-applied over facial challenges.4
For impact litigators, the litigation costs often exceed the benefits of securing narrow victories for their clients through a series of effective as-applied challenges.5 In the election law context, additional concerns further distort this cost-benefit
calculus. This is a context in which clear rules need to be
known in advance and in which plaintiffs often have little incentive to bring challenges once the injury on election day has
occurred. A victory for individual voting rights plaintiffs is
quite often a pyrrhic one, if applied to a narrow class of plaintiffs and only after the winner of the election has been determined.
This Article examines the evolution in the doctrine concerning facial and as-applied challenges and considers the implications of the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied challenges to statutes regulating elections. This Article argues that
the renewed emphasis on as-applied challenges masks other
strategies and arguments concerning how inconvenient
precedent can be overturned and how the Court should stay its
hand when the factual record supporting a challenge requires
further development. Part I sets forth the basic doctrine concerning as-applied and facial challenges. Part II sketches out
two exceptions to the general rule concerning facial challenges—First Amendment and abortion rights—that have also
undergone some transformation in recent cases. Part III discusses the Roberts Court’s recent election law cases, which
have dealt with this issue to a surprising extent. Part IV
presents our conclusions and considers whether election law
3. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes,
46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 272 (1994).
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court—Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (1996) (labeling minimalists and maximalists as those who prefer as-applied and facial challenges respectively).
5. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118
YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2008) (“Reliance on as-applied challenges may . . . entail significant litigation costs for litigants and courts.”).
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cases should be one more arena in which the requirements for
bringing a facial challenge should be relaxed. Finally, Part V
presents an epilogue that considers the constitutional challenge
to the Voting Rights Act (VRA) that the Court was considering
as this Article went to press.
Before delving into the case law—both historic and recent—we should admit to two caveats that should govern any
critique of the doctrine in this area. First, as critical as we
might be of the inconsistency and lack of clarity in the emerging doctrine, we must recognize that this is precisely the type of
constitutional domain directly affected by the effort to build
consensus among Justices of conflicting views. In other words,
when Justices disagree as to how to answer the core constitutional questions in these cases, playing loose with these
“second-order” doctrines may provide one avenue to crafting a
decision that speaks for a Court majority or even supermajority.6 In two of the three recent election cases upon which we focus (the Indiana voter ID case7 and the Washington nonpartisan primary case),8 the lopsided decisions can be attributed to
such strategies. Therefore, the caustic criticism of dissents and
commentators (ourselves included) ought to be tempered by
recognition of the real-world challenges to achieving a clear decision from a multimember body.
Second, as we reiterate several times in this Article, these
seemingly technical doctrinal moves cannot be extracted from
the substantive constitutional debates present in these cases.
Although we may focus at times on the propriety of as-applied
or facial review of a particular dispute, the resolution of these
second-order questions is intimately tied to the primary ques6. Indeed, the strategic use of the as-applied/facial distinction to achieve
consensus was patently clear in the transition period when Justice Alito was
replacing Justice O’Connor. In two cases we later discuss, Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (remanding for asapplied challenge to a law requiring parent notification for abortions), and
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 546 U.S. 410 (2006)
(per curiam) (remanding for as-applied challenge to electioneering communications restrictions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), the Court issued
unanimous opinions in what would otherwise seem controversial cases lending
themselves to split decisions. Indeed, once Wisconsin Right to Life went back
to the full Court, it split five to four. In both of those cases, the remands for
hearings on as-applied challenges allowed the Court to stall and avoid deciding a controversial case while the Court was awaiting a transition in membership.
7. Crawford v. Marion County, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
8. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184
(2008).
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tions over the constitutional bounds on election laws in the given domain. Relying on the facial/as-applied distinction may often appear like a strategy for avoiding the deeper constitutional
inquiries involved. Yet the choice made at this branch on the
constitutional decision tree almost always reflects some position as to the desired outcome in such cases in general. Thus,
while we may concentrate on the significance of favoring one
type of constitutional attack over another, this debate often
represents a proxy war of sorts over the central constitutional
values at stake.
I. THE BASIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING AS-APPLIED
AND FACIAL CHALLENGES
We begin, however, with the basics. A plaintiff can challenge the constitutionality of a statute in two principal ways.
The more ambitious approach—a facial challenge—requires
that a plaintiff prove that the statute is unconstitutional in all
(or nearly all) of its applications.9 After finding a statute to be
facially unconstitutional, courts void the statutory provision so
as to make it unenforceable against anyone.10 The less ambitious, and therefore often more successful approach—an asapplied challenge—alleges that the statute is unconstitutional,
given a particular set of facts and as applied to a particular
plaintiff and others similarly situated.11 The remedy for an asapplied challenge will vary somewhat depending on the nature
of the allegation, but, if doing so is consistent with the meaning
and intent of the statute, a court will excise the plaintiff and
those similarly situated from the statute’s constitutional reach
by effectively severing the unconstitutional applications of the
statute from the unproblematic ones.12 These definitions necessarily gloss over the theoretical controversies explored later in

9. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 236; Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
359, 365 (1998).
10. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 236.
11. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1081 (16th ed. 2007) (“Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case-by-case basis.”).
12. See id. (“If a law restricting speech is invalidated as applied to a protected speaker, it is held inapplicable to that speaker, and thus, in effect, judicially trimmed down.”).
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this Article, but this rudimentary, even if assumed, distinction
serves as a good jumping-off point.
The preference for as-applied challenges, which is hardly
unique to the Roberts Court,13 arises from concerns about judicial restraint and respect for the work of politically accountable
branches.14 The strongest weapon a federal court can wield is
its power to declare an act of a legislative body unconstitutional. A series of doctrines counsels against the use of that power
unless absolutely necessary. For example, federal courts avoid
constitutional questions unless answering them is essential to
deciding the challenge at hand and even then, sometimes abstain if important enough interests counsel against resolution
of the issue at that time.15 Similarly, the “case or controversy”
requirement leads federal courts to avoid deciding cases that
are moot or unripe.16 The preference for as-applied challenges
derives from an analogous impulse: to strike down as little of a
law as possible so as to salvage the constitutional parts of the
law for which either the people or their representatives voted.17
In some cases, deleting (in effect) a few words from the statute
is the most scalpel-like approach to curing a constitutional defect18 whereas in others carving out an exception for a particu13. See Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217,
219–20 (1912) (finding that a statute “as applied to cases like the present” was
valid); see also Douglas Kmiec, Facing Consensus: The Importance of the “Facial” vs. “As Applied” Distinction in the Roberts Court, SLATE, Apr. 29, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/04/29/facingconsensus-the-importance-of-the-facial-versus-as-applied-distinctions-in-theroberts-court.aspx (suggesting that the Roberts Court is furthering a trend
that the Rehnquist Court began).
14. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191
(2008) (“Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge ‘frees the Court not
only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from
premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.’” (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22
(1960))).
15. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936)
(listing seven reasons why the Court might avoid resolving constitutional issues).
16. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (“‘No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37
(1976))).
17. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1191 (“[F ]acial challenges
threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying
the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the
Constitution.”).
18. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 –05 (1985)
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lar plaintiff serves those values.19 When the statute is not
amenable to such a construction or a given plaintiff is not characteristically different from anyone else who might challenge
the law, voiding the law on its face may be the only appropriate
remedy to vindicate the constitutional rights at stake.
Of course, the key question remains when, if ever, facial
invalidation is appropriate—that is, what does a plaintiff need
to prove to have a law voided on its face? The so-called Salerno
standard established that “the challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”20 In addition to what appear to be acknowledged exceptions to the Salerno principle discussed in the following sections, the Court has tacitly embraced facial challenges in a
range of constitutional contexts, both in individual rights cases
and in litigation questioning the proper scope of congressional
power.21 At times, the Court has looked the other way by striking down laws on their face without even acknowledging the facial nature of a challenge, or pausing to consider whether the
statute would, in fact, be unconstitutional in all circumstances.
Those who wish to make facial challenges easier worry that
incremental, as-applied adjudication provides a less effective
means for protecting many individual rights.22 The Salerno
principle, they argue, ignores strategic justifications for preferring facial over as-applied invalidation in certain settings.23 For
(rejecting a facial challenge to a moral nuisance statute and holding that the
proper solution was not to strike down the entire statute, but rather to eliminate its problematic language, namely the word “lust,” in the statutory definition of “prurient”).
19. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (declaring a Tennessee statute invalid only to the extent that it authorized police to use deadly
force against unarmed felons).
20. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis added).
21. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 294.
22. See id. at 240 (criticizing the Salerno rule as vastly inefficient in light
of the “wide gulf [that] separates the statute that might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances from one that operates
unconstitutionally under all circumstances”); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial
Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2005) (“A facial challenge may be . . . a
better means of implementing the Constitution than requiring parties to
mount a series of as-applied challenges because of the costs of case-by-case adjudication.”).
23. See Gans, supra note 22, at 1336; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 193–94 (1976) (“[A] decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute
by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and timeconsuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.”).
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example, facial invalidation may be most effective for laws that
have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of certain constitutional
rights.24 If the chief effect of such laws can be seen in individuals’ avoidance of constitutionally protected behavior, then asapplied litigation brought by injured plaintiffs seeking individualized, scalpel-like judicial remedies will not address the
principal constitutional harm such laws cause. The same can be
said for statutes that risk discriminatory application by conferring excessive discretion on enforcement authorities. For such
laws, addressing individual occurrences of discriminatory enforcement through as-applied challenges might do little to address the underlying constitutional risks that the law
presents.25
The putative “on-off toggle” between facial and as-applied
challenges glosses over serious disagreements among judges
and academics concerning how courts behave when they invoke
these doctrines.26 Most efforts to parse out a coherent facial24. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 277 (supporting the notion that facial challenges are necessary to guard against the “chilling” of various fundamental
rights); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938–40, 945–46 (2000)
(finding that the Nebraska law chilled second trimester abortions); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 893 (1992) (holding a statute unconstitutional after finding that it would deter a “significant number”
of women from procuring abortions).
25. See Gans, supra note 22, at 1361–62 (discussing Louisiana v. United
States, in which the Court struck down Louisiana’s literacy test on the ground
that it subjected voters to the “passing whim or impulse of an individual registrar” (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965))); see also
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (finding that the challenged
statute created a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by police officers, a factor that counseled in favor of facial invalidation); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (finding that facial invalidation is
warranted where a law’s vagueness “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application”). Professor David Gans also suggests that the specter of facial invalidation can spur legislators into action, especially where successful facial challenges would have “momentous consequences,” such as where an entire
sentencing regime or redistricting plan would be nullified. David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 692 (2008) (offering examples of instances where the Court stayed facial invalidation of a
statute in order to give lawmakers an opportunity to fix its constitutional defect).
26. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 294; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1323
(2000) (“[I]t is tempting to say that the Justices of the Supreme Court are not
only divided, but also conflicted or even confused, about when statutes should
be subject to facial invalidation.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and
Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880–83 (2005). But see Isserles, supra
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challenge doctrine recognize that, notwithstanding Salerno, the
categories of facial and as-applied challenges are not mutually
exclusive.27 All statutory challenges actually fall somewhere
along a continuum bookended by facial challenges that ask
courts to invalidate entire statutes and “pure” as-applied challenges that ask courts to invalidate fact-specific instances of enforcement.28 Moreover, the expansiveness of the appropriate
remedy will often depend on the applicable, substantive doctrinal test, given that different constitutional claims necessarily require different types of relief.29
Finally, as Gillian Metzger has argued, “the debate regarding the availability of facial challenges [becomes], at bottom,
fundamentally a debate about severability.”30 In other words,
the appropriateness of narrow versus broad relief depends not
only on the applicable substantive doctrine or the uniqueness of
the plaintiff ’s injury, but also on whether the statute under review is capable of judicial “editing” to remedy the harm denote 9, at 395–415 (arguing that despite its critics, the Salerno principle is
neither draconian nor inconsistent with the Court’s facial challenge practice).
27. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808,
884 –87 (2004); Fallon, supra note 26, at 1324 (“[T]here is no single distinctive
category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation.”).
28. Compare Fallon, supra note 26, at 1326 (arguing that every litigant
challenging a statute is inherently asserting that it cannot be enforced against
them and therefore that all constitutional challenges “are in an important
sense as-applied”), with Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157 (1998)
(“There is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional challenge.”), and
Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1387 n.56
(2000) (“‘[A]s-applied’ challenges in one sense (challenges that vindicate the
personal rights of claimants) do not exist, but . . . ‘as-applied’ challenges in a
different and weaker sense (challenges that make reference to facts about the
claimant, which in turn I construe as partial invalidations of rules) do exist.”).
See generally Driesen, supra note 27, at 859–62 (summarizing the AdlerFallon debate).
29. See Driesen, supra note 27, at 883–85 (exploring the continuum of
judicial decision making between as-applied and facial challenges in different
areas of law).
30. Metzger, supra note 26, at 886–87; see also Alfred Hill, Some Realism
About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647, 664 (2002) (arguing that there has never been an instance of the Court striking down an entire statute that had both valid and invalid components). See generally Fallon,
supra note 26, at 1368 (discussing the tension between facial challenges and
the severability doctrine and observing that because valid subrules can usually be severed from invalid ones, “it is often unnecessary for a court to adjudge
the validity of a statute ‘on its face’; it is enough to determine whether a valid
subrule applies to a particular case”).
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scribed in a given case. Even the most narrow relief that addresses a single plaintiff’s particular constitutional wrong is
unavailable if the statute expressly refuses to contemplate an
exception for such a context.31
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE CONCERNING
FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
A. FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court has long recognized First Amendment overbreadth doctrine as an exception to the Salerno rule concerning
facial challenges.32 Under First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, litigants may seek facial invalidation of a statute that restricts expression, regardless of whether the litigant herself
was engaging in protected speech at the time the statute was
enforced against her.33 In other words, the doctrine eclipses
traditional standing rules by allowing a litigant to assert the
rights of hypothetical third parties, without any need to establish that the statute at issue is unconstitutional as-applied.34
The primary justification for First Amendment overbreadth is that even laws that regulate unprotected speech are
likely to chill the exercise of protected speech by individuals
swept into their regulatory ambit.35 As-applied challenges
31. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320,
321 (suggesting that the critical underlying inquiry is: “Would the legislature
have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”); see also John
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 258–59 (1993) (“Some statutory provisions are the product of compromises that would be disrupted if
one part was allowed to stand as another part fell; such statutes should be
nonseverable.”).
32. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) (“The First
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial challenges.”).
33. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (“Although a statute
may be neither . . . overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied . . . against a
particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its . . . unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient . . . it may not be
applied to him either . . . . [It] is stricken down on its face.” (quoting Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619–20 (1971))).
34. See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987) (“Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual
whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a
statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court . . . .’”
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985))).
35. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 910 (1970). Compare
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21–30 (arguing
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might vindicate the rights of individuals who suffer specific injuries from an unconstitutional statute, but the mere existence
of such a law on the books will lead constitutionally protected
speakers to alter their behavior.36 The concerns about a chilling
effect on protected speech reverse the normal presumption in
favor of judicial restraint and to some extent replace it with a
presumption against constitutionality once an infringement on
speech can be demonstrated.
It nevertheless should be acknowledged that the Court has
rolled back a bit from its more capacious definitions of overbreadth. It has done so in two ways. First, as is generally true
with constitutional avoidance doctrine, courts will attempt to
find a limiting construction that saves the statute from an unconstitutionally overbroad definition.37 When they do so, courts
redefine what the law means on its face rather than merely excising the unconstitutional applications of the law. At times
that may seem like more of a stylistic difference, especially given what was said earlier about the interaction with severability
doctrine. The effect, however, is to prohibit all the unconstitutional applications of the statute by adopting an interpretation

that First Amendment overbreadth flows automatically from substantive First
Amendment law, namely the requirement that laws regulating speech be the
least restrictive means of accomplishing their stated goals, rather than from
any special standing rules or nonseverability presumption), with Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 867–75 (1991)
(maintaining that the justifications for the doctrine vary with the type of
speech being regulated), and Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger
Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1983) (critiquing the chilling-effect theory).
36. The accepted justifications for First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
can be just as relevant in other contexts, and the mechanics of the doctrine
equally applicable. Professor Dorf asserts that the same chilling effect theory
that justifies First Amendment overbreadth doctrine has and should justify
extending it to all “nonlitigation fundamental rights.” Dorf, supra note 3, at
268–71. He also observes that the substantiality requirement used to curtail
the scope of First Amendment overbreadth has also been used “for quite some
time” to limit overbreadth elsewhere, including in abortion cases. Id. at 276;
see also Monaghan, supra note 35, at 37–38 (arguing that overbreadth analysis should be applied “wherever the Supreme Court is serious about judicial
review”).
37. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990); Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (“[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality.” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,
657 (1895))); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could
be placed on the statute.”).
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that cures the constitutional defect while not striking down the
entire provision.
Second, the Court has moved toward a test for “substantial
overbreadth,” which would require that a plaintiff in a facial
challenge prove more than that the statute is unconstitutional
in an extraordinary or conceivable case.38 Although “‘substantial overbreadth’ is not readily reduced to an exact definition,”39
the Court has considered laws to be substantially overbroad if,
when “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep,”40 “a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”41 Substantial overbreadth prevents a declaration of facial unconstitutionality in the event the
plaintiff can drum up some hypothetical person or class whose
speech rights will be chilled or infringed upon. It seems to require that the amount of constitutionally protected speech affected by the law be significant or substantial enough that the
regulation of a great deal of unprotected speech or conduct cannot be justified.
B. ABORTION RIGHTS
The Salerno Court maintained that it had never recognized
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited scope of the First
Amendment.42 However, the Rehnquist Court’s abortion rights
cases represent one area where the Court implicitly endorsed
such an approach, and one where the Roberts Court has begun
to harmonize abortion cases with its general preference for as-

38. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (rejecting an
overbreadth attack against a state trespass law where the underlying trespass
policy, “taken as a whole,” was not substantially overbroad); Broadrick, 413
U.S. at 615.
39. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984).
40. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982) (quoting Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 615).
41. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002).
42. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). But see Sabri
v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (acknowledging that the Court
has “recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though not
necessarily using that term) in relatively few settings,” including abortion and
the Fifth Amendment right to travel); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359
n.8 (1983) (suggesting that facial attacks are proper whenever a statute reaches “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 12 (Supp. 2005) (questioning
whether there is “any principled explanation of when the Court will entertain
overbreadth facial challenges and when it will not”).
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applied challenges.43 As Professor Fallon observed prior to
Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, “[v]irtually all of the abortion
cases reaching the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade . . . have
involved facial attacks on state statutes, and the Court, whether accepting or rejecting the challenges on the merits, has . . .
typically accepted this framing of the question presented.”44 In
cases where these challenges succeeded on the merits, the
usual result was an injunction gutting the entire challenged
provision, regardless of whether it had some constitutional applications.
For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court reached the merits of a facial challenge without any mention of Salerno and invalidated on their
face portions of a Pennsylvania statute which would have operated as an undue burden in “a large fraction” of cases.45 More
recently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down Nebraska’s entire so-called “partial birth abortion” statute on the
ground that its lack of a health exception for the pregnant
woman would lead to numerous unconstitutional applications
of the statute.46 Given their inconsistency with the Salerno
43. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 272 (asserting that Roe v. Wade “exemplifies
overbreadth analysis”).
44. Fallon, supra note 35, at 859 n.29 (citation omitted); see also Stuart
Buck, Salerno v. Chevron: What to Do About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN.
L. REV. 427, 432 (2003) (“A doctrine parallel to that of First Amendment overbreadth has emerged in the abortion context.” (citing Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992))). But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398, 405–06 (1981) (finding that the plaintiff, an unmarried fifteen-yearold girl who lived with her parents, lacked standing to facially attack a state
statute requiring parental notification). Some commentators have argued that
Casey implicitly overruled Salerno, at least with respect to reproductive
rights. See, e.g., Pammela S. Quinn, Note, Preserving Minors’ Rights After Casey: The “New Battlefield” of Negligence and Strict Liability Statutes, 49 DUKE
L.J. 297, 314 (1999) (“Casey implicitly replaced the Salerno test with the ‘undue burden’ standard in the abortion context by its application of that standard.”).
45. 505 U.S. at 895. Casey also underscores the need for litigants alleging
non-First Amendment overbreadth to provide evidentiary support for their
challenge. In Casey, the Court assessed the factual record associated with each
challenged provision of the Pennsylvania statute. Id. at 884 –85, 887, 901.
Since the law’s challengers failed to proffer evidence demonstrating that the
statute’s twenty-four-hour waiting period would rise to the level of being a
“substantial obstacle” for any woman seeking an abortion, the Court upheld
that requirement. Id. at 886–87. By contrast, there was a detailed factual
record establishing that the spousal consent provision would create an undue
burden for almost one percent of women seeking abortions, and accordingly
the Court sustained that facial attack. Id. at 893–95.
46. 530 U.S. 914, 929–30 (2000). The Court also found a second, indepen-
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standard, such cases led Justice Scalia later to excoriate the
majority for creating a “political correctness” exception to the
ordinary rule governing facial challenges.47
Beginning with Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern
New England, the Roberts Court breathed new life into Salerno
by rejecting, as a procedural matter, a facial overbreadth challenge to a New Hampshire statute regulating abortions.48 The
Court avoided the merits of the question—whether New Hampshire could require parental notification without accommodating immediate threats to the pregnant woman’s health49—and
instead turned its attention to the remedy being sought.50 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed that
the “‘normal rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.’”51 She also attempted to distinguish Stenberg, writing that the only reason why the Court invalidated the entire Nebraska statute was because no litigant
had asked for, and the Court “did not contemplate, . . . relief
more finely drawn.”52
A year after Ayotte, the Court reaffirmed its commitment
to rolling back the abortion overbreadth exception.53 In Gonzales v. Carhart, a 5-4 majority reversed the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits’ wholesale invalidations of the Partial Birth Abortion
Act of 2003.54 Both circuits had struck down the Act as unconsdent reason to invalidate the law, in that it “unduly burden[ed] the right to
choose abortion itself.” Id. at 930.
47. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 81 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. 546 U.S. 320, 323, 329 (2006).
49. 546 U.S. at 323–24.
50. Id. at 328.
51. Id. at 329 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,
504 (1985)).
52. Id. at 331. Stuart Buck observes that although the parties in Stenberg
may not have asked the Court to save the Nebraska statute by merely severing or narrowly construing its problematic provisions, at least one amicus brief
did request such relief. See The Buck Stops Here, The Ayotte Case,
http://stuartbuck.blogspot.com/2006/01/ayotte-case.html (Jan. 20, 2006, 11:34
EST) (stating that an amicus brief filed by Feminists for Life had in fact asked
the Court for a narrow interpretation of the statute).
53. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts
Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of
Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1751, 1757–60 (2006) (arguing that the comparative competence of courts strongly cautions against facial adjudication and
predicting that with the succession of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito, the
Court would move further in that direction).
54. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619, 1639 (2007). Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
dissenters, voiced alarm at the majority’s blatant “refus[al]” to take seriously
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titutional because it failed to include a provision that would
have permitted the controversial procedure in circumstances
necessary to protect the health of the mother.55 In overturning
the circuits, the Court declared the Act impervious to facial
challenges, given that the “latitude” (overbreadth) afforded
First Amendment cases was inapplicable.56 As if the point
needed further underscoring, the Court added that the facial
challenges in issue “should not have been entertained in the
first instance.”57 For the first time, the Court explicitly rejected
the notion that all restrictions on abortion procedures require
health exceptions, stating that wherever a factual dispute exists as to whether a statute poses significant health risks to
women, the proper mode of judicial review is case-by-case.58
With respect to the evidence proffered to demonstrate an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion, the Court
found that the challengers failed to show that the act “would be
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases.”59

precedent that not only countenanced the facial invalidation of statutes lacking health exceptions, but also endorsed the general availability of facial challenges in the abortion setting. Id. at 1641.
55. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163,
1172 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007);
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005), overruled by Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). The Ninth Circuit also found the Act impermissibly vague and unduly burdensome on a woman’s right to choose a
second trimester abortion. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 435 F.3d at
1176, 1180–81.
56. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638–39.
57. Id. at 1638.
58. See id. at 1638–39. Although the Court left the door open for asapplied challenges to the Act, it appears as though none followed. See Edward
Whelan, The Mystery of the Missing Lawsuits: One Year After the Supreme
Court’s Partial-Birth-Abortion Ruling, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 18, 2008,
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=MjU3MmU2YmU4ZjAwNDVkY2Nl
OWJkNWE4NThlMGE0MWM= (claiming that no as-applied challenges have
since been brought).
59. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)). In light of the Roberts Court’s retraction of
the abortion overbreadth exception, one article suggests that reproductive
rights advocates might fare better by bringing lawsuits predicated on the
“purpose” prong of Casey’s undue burden test. See Note, After Ayotte: The
Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed ‘Purpose,’ 119 HARV. L. REV.
2552, 2565 (2006). But see Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
(imposing an evidentiary burden on litigants claiming improper motive on the
part of a legislature).
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III. THE SPECIAL CONTEXT OF ELECTION LAW
The emphasis on as-applied challenges as the preferred
method of challenging unconstitutional state action has been
particularly salient in recent election law cases. In the context
of campaign finance, regulation of political parties, and voter
identification requirements, the opinions of the Roberts Court
have discussed the as-applied/facial issue to a degree never before seen in an election law case. These cases illustrate the tension in the evolution of the relevant constitutional jurisprudence, while at the same time they force us to ask whether the
election law context, like the First Amendment and abortion
rights contexts, should be treated as special for some reason.
A.

WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE

Perhaps the largest transformation in election law during
the Roberts Court has occurred in the area of campaign
finance. The replacement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito flipped a fragile 5-4 majority
that was deferential to campaign finance reforms to one that
appears aggressively committed to striking such measures
down as abridging First Amendment rights.60 In fact, the Roberts Court has struck down all three campaign finance laws it
has considered.61 “Struck down” might overstate what it has
done, because in a recent and significant campaign finance decision, the Court vindicated an as-applied challenge that effectively gutted the relevant provisions of the law.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life
(WRTL), the Court struck down Title II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) as applied to an advertisement that asked voters in Wisconsin to call their Senators to
tell them to confirm President Bush’s judicial nominees.62 The
law prohibits the airing of such advertisements, funded by corporate treasury funds, within sixty days of a general election if
60. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 15–18) (discussing the Roberts Court’s campaign finance decisions).
61. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2766, 2775 (2008)
(striking down the so-called Millionaire’s Amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life
(WRTL), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) (striking down BCRA express advocacy
provisions as applied to certain types of ads); Randall v. Sorrell 126 S. Ct.
2479, 2485 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s expenditure and contribution limits).
62. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659–61.
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they “refer[] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”
(the so-called “primary definition” of electioneering communications).63 A pro-life organization called Wisconsin Right to Life
(WRTL) paid for the ad with corporate funds and the ad mentioned by name Senator Russ Feingold, who was up for reelection,64 so it was captured by the law. However, the Court considered the ad protected-issue advocacy, instead of a lessprotected electioneering communication,65 and also held that
the law was unconstitutional as-applied to any similar ad unless the ad was “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”66 The Court split into three camps: Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion (joined by Justice Alito) struck down
the law as-applied;67 Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by
Justices Thomas and Kennedy) would have struck down the
law on its face;68 and Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer) would have upheld the law
both as-applied and on its face.69
Unlike the other opinions we will soon discuss, WRTL is
notable for its vindication of an as-applied challenge, as opposed to its reservation of as-applied challenges en route to denying a facial challenge. Generally, we think of as-applied challenges as carving out exceptions to a largely constitutional
statute.70 However, the WRTL decision strikes down the law as
applied to most of the advertisements to which it was directed.71 Most corporate-funded advertisements that run within
sixty days of a general election and that refer to candidates
running for office are susceptible to some interpretation other
than appeals to vote for or against those candidates.72 Indeed,
63. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(i) (2006), declared unconstitutional as applied
by WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2652.
64. WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2660–61, 2663. It also mentioned Senator Herb
Kohl, who was not up for reelection. See id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 2659, 2663.
66. Id. at 2667.
67. Id. at 2658. Justice Alito also wrote separately to emphasize that if
the standard in the controlling opinion proved unworkable, he would also
strike down the law on its face. See id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring).
68. See id. at 2674, 2686–87.
69. See id. at 2687, 2698–99, 2704 –05.
70. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30).
71. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.
72. See, e.g., id. at 2670 (“WRTL’s ads may reasonably be interpreted as
something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate
. . . .”).
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the reason Congress passed such a sweeping corporate speech
code was that the “magic words” standard of Buckley v. Valeo
proved so easy to get around.73 Ads would end with an exhortation to “call your member of Congress to tell them how you
feel,” instead of an appeal to vote a particular way, but the
message was still clear.74
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
upheld Title II of BCRA on its face, but, in a footnote, left open
the possibility of as-applied challenges.75 The ad at issue in
WRTL presented such a challenge, but the Court’s decision
goes much farther than merely holding that particular ad protected. It created the “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation” standard for as-applied challenges to BCRA going forward.76 This blew a huge hole in the law’s primary definition of
electioneering communications while pretending not to revisit
or undermine the central holding of McConnell77 and while attempting merely to reconcile conflicting precedent concerning
the anti-corruption interest necessary to justify bans on corporate treasury-funded ads.78
73. See id. at 2692, 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)) (“This construction would restrict the application
. . . to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ or ‘reject.’”).
74. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000:
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 29–36, 71–73
(2001) (noting the prevalence of group-sponsored issue ads and arguing that a
sixty-day bright-line test would offer a more precise standard for defining electioneering activity); JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BUYING TIME:
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 9 (2000).
The “Buying Time” studies became a source of great controversy in the
McConnell litigation, so much so that Chief Justice Roberts went out of his
way in WRTL to minimize their significance. See 127 S. Ct. at 2665 & n.4
(mocking the “student coders” of McConnell’s evidentiary record).
75. 540 U.S. 93, 157 n.52, 224 (2003).
76. WTRL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
77. Id. at 2659 (“[I]n upholding § 203 against a facial challenge, we did
not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 2664 (“This Court has already ruled that BCRA survives strict scrutiny to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent. So
to the extent the ads in these cases fit this description, the FEC’s burden is not
onerous; all it need do is point to McConnell and explain why it applies here.”
(citation omitted)).
78. The Court reconciles McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540
U.S. 93 (2003), Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), and First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), so as to come
to the conclusion that the unique anticorruption interest does not extend
beyond corporate-funded express advocacy of the election of candidates.
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Although traditionally conceived as growing from impulses
of judicial restraint, as-applied challenges can also provide an
opportunity, as shown in WRTL, for the sometimes dramatic
reworking of both judicial precedent and statutory meaning. It
is very difficult to reconcile the holding of WRTL with the
Court’s rejection of the facial challenge to Title II in McConnell.79 Perhaps it is so obvious that it need not be said, but this
vindication of the as-applied challenge can best be explained as
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito’s rough compromise between fidelity to precedent (stare decisis) and their fundamental disagreement with McConnell’s holding. The as-applied
holding allows them to carve an exception to the law that is as
large as the legislative record justifying it: most of the “objectionable” ads that formed the core justification of Title II’s
sweeping regulation turn out to be constitutionally protected.
By striking down this law as applied to the facts of this ad and
all others satisfying the “no reasonable interpretation” standard, the Court can say that BCRA Title II is constitutional in
theory, but rarely in practice. Moreover, as Justice Alito’s separate opinion states, the new as-applied standard allows for the
possibility that further challenges will demonstrate its unworkability and prove the necessity of overturning the law on its
face.80
Completely unmentioned in the controlling opinion is the
fact that Title II of BCRA had its own built-in way to accommodate Roberts and Alito’s misgivings: a backup definition of electioneering communications would be triggered if the primary
definition were held unconstitutional. In the event the primary
definition of electioneering communications (the “refers to a
clearly identified candidate” standard) were declared unconstitutional, Title II provided a secondary definition:
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate
WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 (“These cases did not suggest, however, that the interest in combating ‘a different type of corruption’ extended beyond campaign
speech.”).
79. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064,
1103–08 (2008) (noting the tension between McConnell’s overbreadth holding
and the reasoning of WRTL).
80. WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If it turns out that
the implementation of the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion
impermissibly chills political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future
case to reconsider the holding in McConnell that § 203 is facially constitutional.” (citation omitted)).
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for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or
against a specific candidate.81

However, because it limits itself to the law as applied to those
plaintiffs, the WRTL holding did not technically trigger the
backup definition.
From the standpoint of as-applied doctrine or jurisprudence, the Court’s decision to redefine the primary definition of
electioneering, rather than to strike it down and trigger the
backup, is peculiar along several dimensions. The remedy to an
as-applied challenge depends, in part, on severability of the relevant statute—that is, the Court carves out an exception for
the plaintiff while remaining true, if possible, to the purpose of
the statute.82 However, WRTL guts the primary definition of
electioneering and substitutes its own definition, which is very
close, but not precisely the same, as the backup definition.83 In
doing so, the Court rewrites a law that does not need to be rewritten and does so in a way that Congress specifically avoided.
The normal preference for as-applied challenges arising from
considerations of judicial restraint is completely inapposite
here when Congress has clearly expressed its preference in legislation and the Court’s sweeping exception swallows the legislative rule while adopting a third option for which no one voted.
Given the similarities in impact between the Court’s new
standard and the backup definition, it becomes even more difficult to characterize the decision as truly an as-applied holding.
It is difficult to think of an ad that could be regulated under the
Court’s definition of electioneering (one capable of no reasonable interpretation other than an exhortation to vote for or
against a candidate84) but that would not be regulated under
the statute’s backup definition (which covers all ads that both
are incapable of no other “plausible meaning” other than an exhortation to vote for or against and also promote, support, attack, or oppose a candidate).85 If that is right, then the Court
actually struck down the primary definition on its face by carv81. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii) (2006), declared unconstitutional as applied
by WRTL, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
82. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30).
83. Compare WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667 (creating the “susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation” standard), with 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii) (setting
forth the “susceptible of no plausible meaning” standard).
84. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
85. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii).
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ing out all possible applications of the primary definition that
would not have been covered by the secondary definition.
Finally, there is no mention at all in the controlling opinion
that the First Amendment standard for facial challenges differs
from that for the run-of-the mill constitutional case. As noted
above, “substantial overbreadth” is the most that would be necessary to strike down a speech restriction on its face.86 It is
almost as if campaign finance (or perhaps election law more
generally) were viewed as an exception to the First Amendment
exception to facial challenges. Surely, the logic of the opinion
and a cursory look at the legislative record suggest that, at a
minimum, a “substantial number” of the applications of the
primary definition of electioneering are unconstitutional,
“judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”87
B.

WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE

This last critique of WRTL—that it ignores the uniqueness
of the facial/as-applied distinction in the First Amendment context—can also be lodged against the Court’s 7-2 decision in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party.88 There, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
Washington’s modified blanket primary system, which allowed
any candidate to express a “party preference” on a unified primary ballot.89 The parties argued that this represented forced
association in violation of the First Amendment because voters
would assume the party had endorsed, nominated, or associated itself with such a candidate, when it might specifically
want to disavow such a candidate.90 The Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge but left open the door to future asapplied challenges once the state had crafted an actual ballot in
which a plaintiff could show voter confusion.91
Washington State Grange illustrates the interrelationship
or slippage between the as-applied doctrine and the doctrines of
ripeness and constitutional avoidance. The deficiency in the facial challenge brought by the parties there was not that it
failed, per se, to prove that the law was unconstitutional in all
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–771 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
88. 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
89. Id. at 1187.
90. Id. at 1189.
91. Id. at 1195.
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its applications. Rather, the challenge failed because the law
had not yet been applied at all, so it was unclear if it would be
unconstitutional in all or any of its applications.92 This is a subtle but important difference. At this preenforcement stage, the
Court could not strike down the law because it did not know
what the law actually meant, nor could it discern whether a
constitutional violation would occur once it was enforced.93 Unlike the paradigmatic rejection of a facial challenge on the
grounds that some applications of the law would be constitutional, here the Court suggested that the law might be unconstitutional in all of its applications (that is, if it caused voter
confusion), but such an injury was mere speculation at the time
the lawsuit was filed.94
Perhaps more than in any other case—certainly any other
election law case—the Washington State Grange opinion explains the rationale for avoiding facial invalidations if at all
possible. The Court warns about claims of facial invalidity because they “often rest on speculation” and “raise the risk of
‘premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually
barebones records.’”95 The majority opinion also extols the virtue of a bias against facial invalidation as arising from general
principles of judicial restraint (not deciding a constitutional issue unless absolutely necessary and even then crafting as narrow a rule as possible) and respect for the democratic process.96
Therefore, while a law that authentically confused voters as to
whether a candidate was in fact the party’s nominee or even a
party member might be unconstitutional, one that merely allowed candidates to state a party preference was not.97 To assess the constitutionality of the law, the Court needed to await
92. See id. (“Each of the [respondents’] arguments rests on factual assumptions about voter confusion, and each fails for the same reason: In the
absence of evidence, we cannot assume that Washington voters will be
misled.”).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1193. One other possible interpretation would be that the
Court, once voter confusion is shown, would only strike down the law as applied to the party that had been injured by the confusion. That seems implausible given that such relief would then never cure the constitutional injury. At a
minimum, the Court might prospectively immunize the party from having
candidates use its name as a party preference. But it is difficult to see why one
party would be susceptible to voter confusion as to whom it supports while
another would not be.
95. Id. at 1191 (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)).
96. Id. at 1191.
97. See id. at 1195.
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both the state’s interpretation and enforcement of the law and
the concomitant confusion, if any, that it would produce.98
Rather than describing this decision as one upholding the
law on its face while reserving the right to strike it down as applied to some later plaintiff (à la McConnell), it seems more appropriate to say that the Court (despite express language to the
contrary)99 merely refused to pass judgment on the law because
the factual record was inadequate to establish a constitutional
violation. One could describe this as an argument concerning
ripeness, standing, abstention, or simply the failure of the
plaintiffs to provide an adequate factual record to demonstrate
an “injury in fact.” But whatever one calls it, the “upholding” of
the law against a facial attack was really more about dismissing the claim because of a lack of information about the law
and its effects.
Perhaps the best way to reveal what the Court was really
doing is to envision what the next case would look like. Suppose
a Nazi sympathizer runs in the primary and expresses a preference for the Republican Party. And suppose that preference is
expressed by putting an “R” next to his name on the ballot, but
the ballot in small print at the bottom of the first page (or even
worse, in some separate ballot pamphlet) indicates that party
preference designations do not imply any association, membership, or endorsement of the political party.100 And suppose a
later poll or other study reveals that most voters thought that
the candidate was endorsed by the Republican Party. The Republican Party brings suit, now having already suffered the injury (suppose, even worse, that candidate wins office so the injury is long-lasting or irreparable). If the party launches a
successful challenge to the law, can the Court strike down the
law on its face based on these new developments or could it, at
most, strike it down as applied to the Republican Party and any
other party victimized by similar confusion?
In the traditional way of considering facial invalidity, it
would appear that the law should be struck down on its face.
The law is not unconstitutional because of the specific and
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1196 (“[B]ecause there is no basis in this facial challenge for
presuming that candidates’ party-preference designations will confuse the voters, [the law] . . . is facially constitutional.”).
100. As it turned out, the ballot notation for the 2008 election said “Prefers
Republican Party” or “Prefers Democratic Party” under the candidate’s name.
See KITSAP COUNTY, WASH., SAMPLE BALLOT (2008), available at http://www
.kitsapgov.com/aud/elections/archive/08/sample%20ballot%20gen%202008.pdf.
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unique harms befalling the Republican Party; we simply know
more about the meaning of the law and the extent of the potential injury than we did when the statute stood unenforced. Given that no remedy the Court could order would retroactively
undo the harm of the confusion that led to the Nazisympathizing candidate’s election, it makes no sense to suggest
(as is often the case when considering unconstitutional applications) that the law was unconstitutional as applied to the Republican Party in the context of a particular candidacy. Any relief must be of a kind that holds this law, as enforced and
interpreted, unconstitutional as applied to every party for every
candidate based on the evidence gleaned from that experience.101
The Court’s decision rejecting the facial challenge conflates
two problems: the absence of a ballot (or state court interpretation) implementing the law and the absence of actual confusion
arising from whatever ballot format the state employs.102 The
difference between those two deficiencies in this case is important for cases going forward. If the principal problem was the
Court not knowing what the law would mean and what the ballot would look like, then the decision has a minor effect in the
run-of-the-mill case in which the meaning of a law is clearer.
Moreover, a challenge to the law need only wait until the ballot
is printed, not until voter confusion results in the election of a
candidate that the party objects to. If the crux of the Court’s
decision rests on the absence of voter confusion on the record
before it, then the implications may be more dramatic and
harmful. The result would be that a party (or rather, the polity)
must first suffer the injury of voter confusion in an actual election before it or any other party can prove the law’s unconstitutionality.
This is more than a mere academic or semantic point. The
effect of the Court’s decision is to force plaintiffs to suffer irre101. One might say that the Court should strike down, on its face, the interpretation of the law by the state courts or administrative bodies while
upholding the statute on its face because it could have been interpreted or enforced differently. There are two responses to this objection. First, the meaning of a state law for purposes of federal court review includes the state’s definition and interpretation of the law. Second, even if one believes that the
Court was, in a technical sense, upholding the statute but striking down its
interpretation, it is doing both on their face. The Court’s decision will apply to
all potential plaintiffs because the injury will extend to them based on this
new knowledge of how the law works.
102. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195.
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parable harm (in this case, confused voters in an election) in
order to generate evidence as to the law’s unconstitutionality.
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence took a different approach,
which illustrates the problem with the majority’s couching the
case in the terms of as-applied or facial invalidity. For him, the
only dispositive question was what the ballot would look like:
If the ballot is designed in such a manner that no reasonable voter
would believe that the candidates listed there are nominees or members of, or otherwise associated with, the parties the candidates
claimed to “prefer,” the I-872 primary system would likely pass constitutional muster. I cannot say on the present record that it would be
impossible for the State to design such a ballot . . . . On the other
hand, if the ballot merely lists the candidates’ preferred parties next
to the candidates’ names, or otherwise fails clearly to convey that the
parties and the candidates are not necessarily associated, the I-872
system would not survive a First Amendment challenge.103

If the judge considers confusion to be a likely consequence
of the ballot design, Roberts would have him strike it down on
its face without having to wait for actual confusion at the
polls.104 “Nothing in my analysis,” Roberts wrote, “requires the
parties to produce studies regarding voter perceptions on this
score, but I would wait to see what the ballot says before deciding whether it is unconstitutional.”105
C. CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD
The Washington State Grange case seemed like an exotic
election law dispute until a controlling opinion for the Court
used its holding concerning as-applied challenges as precedent
for the Court’s most significant election case of the 2007-2008
Term: Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.106 There, the
Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification requirement
against a facial challenge, while expressly reserving the possibility that the requirement might be unconstitutional as applied to particular plaintiffs in some later case.107 Like Washington State Grange, however, the opinion is somewhat unclear
103. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008) (declaring that Washington State
Grange’s reasoning “applied with added force” to petitioner’s arguments).
107. See id. at 1623 (“[W]e note that petitioners have not demonstrated
that the proper remedy—even assuming an unjustified burden on some voters—would be to invalidate the entire statute.”); see also id. at 1623 n.20 (responding to the dissent’s concern that the law would burden “tens of thousands” of voters by arguing that such concerns were based on “speculation,”
not “admissible evidence”).
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as to whether the problem with the plaintiffs’ case was a bad
set of facts, an inadequate record, poor lawyering, or premature
adjudication.
The Court split three ways in Crawford. Justice Stevens
wrote the controlling opinion for himself, Justice Kennedy, and
Chief Justice Roberts, rejecting the facial challenge but leaving
open the possibility of future as-applied challenges.108 Justice
Scalia concurred, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, arguing
that the law should be upheld on its face and future as-applied
challenges should be foreclosed.109 Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, submitted a dissent, as did Justice Breyer;
they would have struck down the law on its face.110
The controlling opinion is somewhat inexact in its assessment of the severity of the burden on voting rights posed by the
photo ID law and of the number of people for whom it will
present a severe burden.111 In part, this is a result of what Justice Stevens finds to be insufficient facts in the record on these
critical points.112 The plaintiffs did not produce a single person
who would say that he or she would not vote because of the ID
requirement.113 The number of Indianans without ID was uncertain and contested and as to the difficulties faced by the elderly and indigent voters in their attempts to obtain ID, “the
record says virtually nothing.”114 “[E]ven assuming an unjustified burden on some voters,” the controlling opinion maintains,
those challenging the law had not demonstrated that facial invalidation was the proper remedy.115
Left hanging in the opinion is the question of what type of
evidence might have been sufficient to warrant striking down
the law on its face or what future plaintiffs would need to demonstrate to prove the law unconstitutional as applied to
108. See id. at 1613, 1621.
109. See id. at 1625–26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (preferring a “general assessment of the burden” over “voter-by-voter examination”).
110. See id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1623 n.20 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 1622 (“[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.”).
113. Id. at 1614.
114. Id. at 1622.
115. Id. at 1623 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England,
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) and Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008)).
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them.116 If the opinion really is about the deficiencies in the
record, then it seems to leave open the possibility that the law
is both unconstitutional on its face and as-applied to some subset of voters who have difficulty getting a photo ID. At the time
the district court had heard the challenge to the ID law, no
statewide election had taken place, and as mentioned before, no
voter came forward to say he or she would not be able to vote
because of the law.117 If in a subsequent election it turns out
that a large number of voters cannot vote because of the ID requirement,118 maybe we will learn that the law is unconstitutional on its face because the State’s anti-fraud interests do not
justify such an impediment for such a large number of people.
Or, even if the law is constitutional on its face, perhaps a small
group of voters (or maybe even just an individual voter) has
sufficient difficulty getting an ID that they can prove the law
unconstitutional as applied to them. Such might have been the
case for the now-famous group of nuns that had difficulty voting in the Indiana presidential primary.119
Of course, these options are more theoretical than real, at
least in the context of the Indiana law. The number of voters as
to whom one could definitively prove that acquiring a photo ID
is severely burdensome such that they will not vote almost certainly does not rise to a level that would justify striking the law
down on its face.120 This is especially true given the credence
and significance the Court attributed to the state’s anti-fraud
116. Soon after Crawford, an Indiana voter brought an as-applied challenge to the Voter ID Law, this time buttressing the constitutional claims with
evidence that he personally had to travel a great distance and pay fees in order to obtain a valid state identification. Stewart v. Marion County, No. 1:08CV-586-LJM-TAB, 2008 WL 4690984, at *1–3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008). Recently, the district court denied the plaintiff ’s motion for temporary injunctive
relief on the ground that despite demonstrated inconveniences, the record still
lacked evidence of “a burden that, on balance, outweighs the State’s interest in
protecting against voter fraud” under Crawford. Id. at *3.
117. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952.
118. Of course, “how large a number of voters” and “how severe the burden”
will remain the critical questions. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (reviewing
prior election cases focusing on the severity of the burden and the number of
voters affected).
119. See Associated Press, Nuns with Dated ID Turned Away at Polls,
MSNBC.COM, May 6, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24490932/.
120. Michael Pitts estimates that approximately 400 voters in the Indiana
presidential primary election did not have their provisional ballots counted
because of a failure to present ID. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the
Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287735.
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interests.121 And for those voters who face a special burden navigating the bureaucratic hurdles to acquire an ID, launching a
federal as-applied lawsuit would hardly seem to be an easier
path to the voting booth.122
The lack of clarity in the meaning of the Crawford decision
illustrates unique problems concerning the as-applied/facial
distinction in voting rights cases. In the ordinary constitutional
case governed by the Salerno standard, the demonstration of a
severe burden on the rights of a subgroup disparately affected
by the law (all else equal) would lead a court to find the law unconstitutional as applied to that group but not to those for
whom the law does not present a severe burden. However, the
constitutional test that comes from Anderson v. Celebrezze,123
and which the Court applied in Crawford, acknowledges the
possibility that a severe burden on a minority of people affected

121. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9–12) (discussing the importance of the Court’s decision regarding the state’s antifraud interests and the
relationship between that issue and the Court’s consideration of the facial/asapplied distinction).
122. Crawford led lower courts to reject facial challenges with the added
caveat that as-applied challenges relying on the same constitutional theories
could potentially succeed. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
544 F.3d 976, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a facial attack to an Arizona
immigration statute that had yet to be enforced, but inviting litigants to bring
future challenges “if and when . . . the factual background is developed” (citing
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621)); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 530
(6th Cir. 2008) (declaring facial invalidation inappropriate where the full impact of a statute remained speculative and explaining that it would be “far
more prudent to ‘await an as-applied challenge’ to decide whether the Act is
constitutional in a discrete factual setting” (citing Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at
1621–23; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct.
1184, 1184, 1194 –95 (2008))); Ray v. Texas, No. 2-06-CV-385, 2008 WL
3457021, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) (upholding a Texas law that prohibited
the act of signing as a witness to more than one early voting ballot application,
relying at least in part on the fact that, as in Crawford, the record below
lacked “concrete evidence” demonstrating a severe enough burden on voter
participation); cf. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1213 (D.N.M. 2008) (rejecting both a facial challenge and an
as-applied challenge to New Mexico’s statutory restrictions on third-party voter registration drives and citing Crawford for the proposition that plaintiffs
lodging facial attacks may bear a heavy burden of persuasion). The most significant and telling post-Crawford voting rights opinion may be Florida State
Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1237 (N.D. Fla.
2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to Florida’s voter-registration law requiring
a matching verification process). Cases concerning the added burdens placed
on voters mismatched in voter registration lists will become more prevalent in
the continuing debate over voter fraud and access.
123. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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by the law could still justify facial invalidation of the law.124
Such was the case when the Court struck down a poll tax on its
face rather than simply ruling that it was unconstitutional as
applied to poor people.125 In Crawford, the controlling opinion
held that the petitioners failed to prove that the law posed “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”126
Therefore, if the plaintiffs in a future case could demonstrate a
severe burden on at least some voters, the Court would then
need to answer whether the class of severely burdened voters
was sufficiently large to outweigh the state’s antifraud interests and whether the proper remedy would be invalidating the
statute or simply protecting the burdened voters by striking it
down as applied to them.
The potential effect of the Court’s facial holding was not
lost on Justice Scalia, who thought that the only constitutional
question was the impact of the photo ID requirement on voters
generally, not any subgroup in particular.127 He derided the
controlling opinion as relying on a “record-based resolution of
these cases.”128 For him, the fact that the law applied to everyone and had no invidious discriminatory purpose was the end of
the matter.129 The burden on all voters was the same, even
124. See 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (suggesting a potentially different outcome if
the majority could have concluded that the statute imposed “excessively burdensome requirements”).
125. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). The
Crawford Court tried to distinguish Harper by suggesting that unlike that
case, an election-related state interest (preventing fraud) justifies the Indiana
ID rule whereas a poll tax was unrelated to voter qualifications. See Crawford,
128 S. Ct. at 1615–16; id. at 1626 & n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have
never held that legislatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally
unrelated to money, for their impacts on poor voters or must otherwise accommodate wealth disparities.”). Of course, the proponents of the poll tax
thought it was very relevant to voter qualifications. 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J.,
dissenting). One might also ask whether, as to the state justification, the tax
would then be constitutional if used to fund elections, as opposed to fund
schools as was true in Virginia. See id. at 664 n.1 (majority opinion).
126. 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1914))
(emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 1627.
129. To hold otherwise “would effectively turn back decades of equalprotection jurisprudence,” Scalia argued, because “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class.” Id. at 1626. This is a
peculiar argument to make in the voting rights context given that the fundamental interest prong of equal protection, not the suspect classification prong,
is the constitutional source for the right to vote. Indeed, this approach would
itself turn back the clock—effectively overruling a series of cases from Rey-
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though some voters, because of their personal situations, felt
different impacts from the law.130 His discomfort with the specter of “constant litigation” where the “potential allegations of
severe burden are endless” suggests that even those voters who
suffered unique impacts from the law would be out of luck.131
IV. AN “ELECTION LAW EXCEPTION” TO THE DOCTRINE
GOVERNING FACIAL CHALLENGES?
Justice Scalia’s concurrence did not end with his objection
to the “record-based resolution”132 of the voter ID case. What he
next suggested provides a global argument as to why in the
election law arena the Court should prefer facial challenges to
as-applied ones. “This is an area where the dos and don’ts need
to be known in advance of the election,” Scalia explained, “and
voter-by-voter examination of the burdens of voting regulations
would prove especially disruptive.”133 Ordinarily one thinks of
Justice Scalia as pushing in the direction of as-applied challenges,134 but in all three of the election law cases discussed
above he would have either upheld (Crawford) or struck down
(Washington State Grange and WRTL) the laws on their face.135
Even if one disagrees with where he would come out, his concern as to the costs of as-applied challenges in election law cases should also worry those who would be more receptive to regulations of campaign finance and party reform and more
skeptical about voter ID laws. Indeed, as a general matter, the
as-applied/facial challenge doctrine in the election law arena
ought to facilitate the development of clear pre-election rules
nolds v. Sims (one person, one vote) to Bush v. Gore (vague intent of the voter
standard deemed unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). See
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558
(1964) (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). Justice Scalia appears to make an exception for poll taxes and candidate filing fees because
they were related to money, which is a way to distinguish those cases, but not
explain them. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 n.1.
130. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625.
131. Id. at 1626.
132. Id. at 1627.
133. Id. at 1626.
134. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 81 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing what he referred to as the Court’s “entirely irrational
exceptions” to the usual restriction on facial challenges); Janklow v. Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1627; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1198 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); WRTL,
127 S. Ct. 2652, 2676 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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(clarity). The doctrine should also recognize the irreparability
of the injury that often occurs if the results of an election must
serve as the record for establishing an individual’s voting rights
claim (irreparability). Finally, it should acknowledge that the
costs to the individual (or even to litigators or political parties)
in bringing a voting rights lawsuit often outweigh the benefits
of vindicating the individual right to vote (cost).
Given the breakdown in the as-applied/facial challenge distinction, it would be sloppy to advocate for greater facilitation
of facial challenges per se. Whether the Court says it is striking
down a law on its face or as-applied is less important than its
adjudication of the case with a concern toward the salient features of election law challenges described above: clarity, irreparability, and cost. Little practical difference usually exists between a facial challenge that leads to the voiding of a narrow
statutory provision and an as-applied challenge that leads to
broad relief for the plaintiff and a large number of others who
are similarly situated (as in WRTL).136 In the election law context as in others, courts will be called upon both to make exceptions for parties uniquely burdened by a particular law and at
other times to void entire statutes (or large sections of them).
Neither extreme position—that courts should only deal
with such challenges facially or as-applied—is tenable or desirable. Thus, while tentatively suggesting that the Court ought to
lower the bar for facial challenges in election law cases, we
mean to say that broader relief beyond that narrowly tailored
to a plaintiff’s circumstances ought ordinarily to be available.
The need for clear pre-election rules and the drawbacks of deciding legal issues only when the candidate or party who might
benefit is well-known argues against the ordinary hesitancy of
courts to avoid constitutional questions before ascertaining the
precise scope of potential injuries. Even though we would advocate greater judicial rulemaking, as opposed to exceptioncarving, we recognize that reasonable disagreement exists as to
whether courts should be more protective of democracy-related
rights or more deferential to state laws regulating elections.
For those who believe that checking the burdens on minority
parties, speakers, and voters remains the central constitutional
goal in evaluating election law statutes, then the rules judges
create in this realm should reflect greater concern for the “ex-

136. See supra Part III.A.
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ceptional” cases of those who shoulder the disproportionate
weight of such laws.
Because the constitutional law of elections represents a
family of doctrines sometimes only loosely connected by their
relationship to the proper functioning of American democracy,
it is somewhat difficult to argue for a sweeping “election law
exception” to the general principles governing facial and asapplied challenges. We do not and could not argue that any
constitutional question touching on elections must be given the
most capacious answer by judges irrespective of statutory context. Moreover, it may be the case that in some election law
domains the concerns expressed above are less present than in
others. In the realm of campaign finance, for example, the cost
of piecemeal adjudication has not deterred public interest organizations and parties from launching a series of as-applied
challenges.137 But when those characteristically electionrelated concerns are present, the courts ought to relax the burdens on facial challenges that exist in the ordinary case.
Beyond a modest shift in presumptions in favor of considering an election law’s facial validity, however, we would also advocate something akin to “substantial overbreadth” analysis in
many election law contexts. Space constraints prevent a detailed explication here, but as explained earlier in this Article,
it remains a puzzle why the Court did not seem to conduct such
an analysis in the First Amendment election contexts of campaign finance138 and party associational rights.139 In a case
challenging barriers to voting, moreover, something like overbreadth analysis seems unavoidable. The inquiry in Crawford,
as in any similar case, boils down to whether the state can justify the likelihood that a certain number of voters will find it
difficult or impossible to vote because of the law. Although “how
many voters?” and “how difficult?” remain the important questions under any inquiry, the Court must decide whether the
state interests justify the disproportionate burden placed on a
minority of potential voters. That question can rarely be answered by saying that the burdened voters ought to bring asapplied challenges: poll taxes are not unconstitutional as ap137. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 15–18).
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195 n.10 (holding that the
statute was constitutional under the First Amendment because “[it] does not
require the parties to reproduce another’s speech against their will, nor does it
co-opt the parties’ own conduits for speech”).
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plied only to poor people, and literacy tests would not be unconstitutional (if at all)140 as applied only to illiterate people.
The prerequisite to voting is either justifiable—in the abstract
and given the recognized potential to prevent some from voting—as a proper means of serving some state interest or not.
V. EPILOGUE
The Supreme Court is currently considering an challenge
to the constitutionality of Section Five of the newly reauthorized Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District Number One v. Mukasey (“NAMUDNO”).141
That provision requires “covered jurisdictions” to receive federal permission for changes to laws concerning voting.142 Section
Five was passed to constrain certain jurisdictions, particularly
but not exclusively in the South, from enacting racially discriminatory election laws.143 The Court will now consider whether
the law is unconstitutional on its face or as-applied to the
plaintiff, a municipal utility district in Austin, Texas. The utility district argues that the law exceeds congressional power under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment144 and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment145 if it is read to cover a
small jurisdiction with no history of racial discrimination in
voting. Although the district court rejected both facial and asapplied challenges to the statute, the utility district has now
largely abandoned its as-applied argument and described its
challenge to the Supreme Court as primarily a facial one.
Because it is based on a federalism argument challenging
congressional power, the NAMUDNO case differs from the asapplied challenges the Court has considered in WRTL, Washington State Grange, and Crawford.146 Unlike those cases, the
140. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 54
(1959) (upholding the constitutionality of literacy tests).
141. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (NAMUDNO), 573 F.
Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2008), prob. juris. noted 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009).
142. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting
Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 177, 196–99 (2007) (describing the selection of
“covered jurisdictions” and the statute’s purpose of remedying some legislatures’ attempts to “deprive African Americans of their right to vote, regardless
of what a federal court might order”).
143. See id.
144. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
145. Id. at 223–24.
146. See generally Metzger, supra note 26 (discussing federalism and asapplied challenges).
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plaintiff here does not allege that the law places a unique burden on its constitutionally guaranteed rights, per se. Rather,
the petitioner in NAMUDNO argues that the law is particularly unjustified as applied to it, so much so that Congress does
not have the power to capture this jurisdiction within the regulatory reach of the law.147 Under this view of the Enforcement
Clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments, Congress may not
pass a law that unfairly groups jurisdictions with and without
histories of discrimination in voting rights.
The district court rejected the utility district’s as-applied
challenge on several grounds.148 First, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Rome v. United States rejected a similar asapplied claim to the earlier incarnation of the VRA brought by
a city that disclaimed any history of discrimination in voting
rights.149 The district court read Rome to hold that “where, as
here, Congress has compiled a sufficient legislative record to
defeat a facial constitutional challenge . . . an as-applied challenge based on a political subunit’s record of nondiscrimination
must also fail.”150 Second, even if Congress must provide a more
focused jurisdiction-based justification for coverage—a position
never taken by the Court’s majority—the relevant unit for
identifying discrimination would be the state, not each locality
within it.151 Otherwise, Congress could never compile a sufficiently comprehensive record of discrimination by every affected governmental body to justify prophylactic civil rights legislation.152 In the case of the VRA, Congress at least provided
examples of voting rights violations for each of the covered
states, even if not for each of the hundreds of governmental
sub-units within them.153 Finally, Congress acts as a national
policymaker when it enacts prophylactic or remedial civil rights
legislations. Its findings are necessarily national in scope, not
tailored to every single jurisdiction affected by the proposed
law.

147. See NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 278–82.
148. See id.
149. 446 U.S. 156, 157–58 (1980).
150. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (internal citation omitted).
151. Id. at 280–81.
152. Id. (agreeing with the NAACP that adopting a local instead of state
approach would “require Congress to determine the appropriateness” of the
law in every “state, county, city, village, [and] utility district”).
153. See Persily, supra note 143, at 195–207 (discussing the legislative
record for the reauthorized VRA).
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The structure of the VRA also provides its own administrative analog to as-applied challenges. Through its “bailout” provisions154 the VRA allows jurisdictions to escape coverage by
proving in court their record of good behavior with respect to
minority voting rights for the previous ten years.155 Therefore,
if a covered jurisdiction considers itself unjustifiably burdened
by the requirement of preclearance, it can sue for bailout in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. To do so does
not require a showing that the law is unconstitutional asapplied to the jurisdiction, just that its recent record of behavior with respect to voting rights has proven that coverage is
unwarranted.
Recognizing this potential avenue of relief, the plaintiff in
NAMUDNO asked, in the alternative, that bailout be made
available to it.156 Under the statute, however, only jurisdictions
that register voters have the status requisite for bailout.157 Neither the state of Texas, nor Travis County, has sought bailout.158 In fact, Travis County, where the municipal utility district is located, has intervened in opposition to the district’s
constitutional challenge to the VRA.159 Therefore, the utility
district, in effect, is asking the Court to reinterpret the notion
of covered jurisdictions so as to avoid the alleged constitutional
difficulties that such broad coverage presents.
Because striking down the VRA on its face would represent
a tectonic shift in federal court review of congressional power to
enforce civil rights, a Court that is skeptical of the VRA’s constitutionality might gravitate toward some version of an asapplied challenge. The NAMUDNO case would be the wrong
vehicle for the Court to take such a stand. Striking down the
statute as applied to a subjurisdiction or allowing it to bailout
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2000).
155. See id.; J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006 257,
258–66 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) (describing the history of the bailout provisions); Michael McDonald, Who’s Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 255, 257 (David L. Epstein et al.
eds., 2006) (describing the history of the bailout mechanism and exploring alternatives).
156. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (“The term ‘political subdivision’ shall mean
any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any
other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”).
158. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
159. Id. at 230.
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would not represent mere tinkering at the edges of the VRA regime. Editing the statute in this way cuts to the heart of what
Congress was trying to do when it developed a coverage formula that was well-known to be both over- and under-inclusive.
Congress considered the statute necessary to capture most of
the worst offenders of minority voting rights. Such a ruling
would have implications for other civil rights laws by effectively
carving out exceptions for any jurisdiction for which findings of
discrimination have not been made.
For a Court uncomfortable with the depth and breadth of
the statute’s regulation of states and localities, another quasias-applied challenge is available. The Court could wait until a
qualified jurisdiction attempts to bail out and then read the
bailout requirements in such a way as to avoid constitutional
difficulty. Because very few jurisdictions have attempted to bail
out and none have been refused since 1982,160 we do not know
how high the bar for bailout really is. If and when a jurisdiction
on the margin is refused bailout, then the Court can reconsider
whether those criteria are unduly burdensome. Only when a
jurisdiction attempts to do so, however, could the Court carve
out what constitutes an as-applied exception to the general statutory scheme. Just as the Court recrafted the standard for express advocacy in WRTL,161 it could “edit” the bailout provisions to make it somewhat easier to escape Section Five
coverage.
Moreover, if the Court is concerned by the federalism costs
of the new VRA, it could read the new retrogression standard
in such a way as to make preclearance more likely. Under the
reauthorized VRA, a jurisdiction will be denied preclearance
from the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia if its proposed voting law has the purpose
or effect of “diminishing the ability of” minority voters “to elect
their preferred candidates of choice.”162 The preclearance standard represents the true burden, if any, on the covered jurisdictions. Coverage, by itself, which is the source of the complaint
in NAMUDNO, only raises federalism concerns if jurisdictions
have a legitimate fear that their voting laws will not be allowed
to go into effect. If, in operation, the standard pushes the constitutional envelope by denying preclearance to voting laws
160. See Hebert, supra note 155, at 257.
161. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2655
(2007).
162. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b) (West Supp. 2008).
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that are usually constitutional, then the Court can either vindicate as-applied challenges to that standard or, more likely,
simply interpret it narrowly enough to assuage concerns about
the burdens it places on states’ rights.
Each of these avenues of relief is reminiscent of the paths
the Court has taken in Washington State Grange and Crawford, when it rejected a facial challenge while leaving open the
door to future as-applied challenges. Just as in those cases the
Court raised what seemed like ripeness concerns in the context
of its discussion of facial challenges, the NAMUDNO case
comes to the Court without a firm record as to how the new
VRA will work in practice. Just as the Court wanted to wait
until the ballot in Washington confused voters or the voter ID
law disenfranchised an identifiable group of people, so too in
NAMUDNO should it wait to see the extent of the burden the
new VRA places on covered jurisdictions. If it turns out that the
law unduly restricts covered jurisdictions in their enforcement
of clearly constitutional voting laws, then the Court can consider an as-applied challenge in those enforcement contexts.

